Adjudicating Death: Professionals or Politicians? by Choi, Stephen J. & Gulati, Mitu
Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 70
Issue 6 Issue 6 - November 2017 Article 3
11-2017
Adjudicating Death: Professionals or Politicians?
Stephen J. Choi
Mitu Gulati
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Judges Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen J. Choi and Mitu Gulati, Adjudicating Death: Professionals or Politicians?, 70 Vanderbilt Law Review 1709 (2017)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol70/iss6/3
Adjudicating Death: Professionals or
Politicians?
Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati*
INTRODUCTION.............................................. 1709
I. BACKGROUND ........................................ 1716
II. DATA .......................................... ....... 1718
III. ANALYSIS ............................................ 1721
CONCLUSION .......................................... ..... 1726
INTRODUCTION
On February 13, 2016, Justice Antonin Scalia was found dead in
his room at a ranch in West Texas, where he was on a hunting vacation,
with a pillow over his head.' It is possible that people die with pillows
over their heads, but this was the most famous member of the U.S.
Supreme Court, who was in good enough health to go on a hunting
vacation and had shown few signs of illness to his hunting companions.
That said, Justice Scalia was in his late seventies and had the kinds of
preexisting medical conditions that made it probable that he had died
of natural causes. Nevertheless, there was enough in the story to get
conspiracy theorists riled up, and even our current President (then,
candidate) said in response to an interviewer asking him about the
possibility of something suspicious: "It's a horrible topic, but they say
* Faculty at the law schools of NYU and Duke, respectively. For comments on multiple
stages of this project, we are grateful to Joe Boatwright, Cindy Gardner, Tracey George, and Un
Kyung Park. Katherine Boyles provided exceptional research assistance on a topic where the
research material was hard to come by.
1. See Nora Kelly, Why Wasn't Antonin Scalia Given an Autopsy?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/antonin-scalia-autopsy/463251/
[https://perma.cclYZ52-FN2L] (highlighting the initial uncertainty regarding the placement of a
pillow near Scalia's head); Judy Melinek, Justice Scalia's Unexamined Death Points to a Problem,
CNN (Feb. 20, 2016, 9:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/18/opinions/justice-scalia-no-autopsy-
melineklindex.html [https://perma.ccV32H-V5C8] (examining issues with the current system of
death investigation).
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they found a pillow on his face, which is a pretty unusual place to find
a pillow." 2
Yet, the death examiner, Cinderela Guevara-not a trained
pathologist, but a local county judge-decided to forego the autopsy
without visiting the scene because the county sheriff assured her that
there was "no foul play," Justice Scalia's personal physician told the
judge that the death was due to "natural causes," and the Scalia family
requested that no autopsy take place. 3 Had, by contrast, Justice Scalia
died in a hotel in Boston, Singapore, or Tokyo, there would have been a
detailed investigation and an autopsy by a qualified pathologist.4 That
is, the kind of examination that those of us who watch crime shows on
television assume happens in every case.
Putting aside the credibility of Alex Jones and other conspiracy
theorists about whether President Obama or aliens were eliminating
conservative Supreme Court Justices prior to the 2016 presidential
election,5 there exists a real question here, which is whether there needs
to be a uniform system of professional death examinations across the
United States. Currently, there are counties and states where decisions
about autopsies and the issuance of death certificates are made by a
local coroner who often needs nothing more than a high school diploma
to run for election to the job of coroner.6 In the nineteenth century, the
coroner system predominated in the United States. Many but not all
states shifted toward professional medical examiners in the twentieth
2. See Gideon Resnick, Meet the Scalia Death Truthers: Was He Murdered by Obama or
Aliens?, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 16, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/meet-the-scalia-
death-truthers-was-he-murdered-by-obama-or-aliens [https://perma.cclY9AS-2QAT] (reporting on
an interview with President Donald Trump by Michael Savage and on Alex Jones's conspiracy
theories on the matter).
3. See Mark Berman, Texas Judge Defends Decision Not to Order Autopsy for Justice Scalia,
WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.comlnews/post-
nation/wp/2016/02/16/texas-judge-defends-decision-not-to-order-autopsy-for-justice-
scalia/?utm_term=.91b61b0fb9a8 [https://perma.cc/M3VF-BSY9] (discussing criticism and
conspiracy resulting from the decision not to perform an autopsy).
4. See Melinek, supra note 1 (discussing the independent death investigations conducted by
medical examiner officers in urban areas).
5. See Brian Tashman, Alex Jones: Obama Murdered Justice Scalia and Donald Trump Is
Next, RIGHT WING WATCH (Feb. 14, 2016, 6:15 PM), http://www.rightwingwatch.org/post/alex-
jones-obama-murdered-justice-scalia-and-donald-trump-is-next/ [https://perma.cclVD5D-MED6
(detailing conspiracy theory).
6. See Carl Parrott, Advantages and Disadvantages of the Coroner System, in 2003
MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYS.: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 25, 25,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK221919/pdflBookshelfNBK221919.pdf
[https://perma.cc/43XP-ALSA] [hereinafter MEDICOLEGAL WORKSHOP SUMMARY] ("Coroners are
elected lay people who often do not have professional training, whereas medical examiners are
appointed and have board-certification in a medical specialty."). See generally JEFFREY M.
JENTZEN, DEATH INVESTIGATION IN AMERICA: CORONERS, MEDICAL EXAMINERS, AND THE PURSUIT
OF MEDICAL CERTAINTY (2009) (comparing systems of death investigation in the United States).
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century. Members of the medical profession who work in this area have
long expressed concern about the persistence of coroners today in
certain states.7 For them, the answer is obvious: the system should be
run by highly trained, board-certified pathologists.8 Our instinct is that
the doctors are probably right. Given that there is significant variation
across the states in terms of whether death examination offices are run
by trained professionals or local politicians, we should, in theory, be
able to empirically test the question of whether professionals or
politicians do a better job of adjudicating death. It turns out that,
although there are strong opinions about what the answer surely is,
there has been little in the way of serious empirical work addressing
this question. Our Article takes a first cut at looking at how one might
do that analysis.
The question of whether professionals or politicians are best
suited for a given task is not unique to death examiners. There has, for
example, long been a robust debate on the question of whether
appointed judges (professionals) are better than elected judges
(politicians). Politicians are likely to be more responsive to the
immediate needs of the voting public; after all, they want to be
reelected. But that also means that they are likely to be less
independent. 9 If they believe that being hard on criminals is a good vote-
getting strategy, they are likely to do that. Indeed, research suggests
7. E.g., Melinek, supra note 1; see also Randy Hanzlick, The Conversion of Coroner Systems
to Medical Examiner Systems in the United States: A Lull in the Action, 28 AM. J. FORENSIC MED.
& PATHOLOGY 279, 279 (2007) (explaining the importance of qualified medical examiners); Randy
Hanzlick & Debra Combs, Medical Examiner and Coroner Systems: History and Trends, 279 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 870, 874 (1998) (describing reduced support for replacing coroners with medical
examiners as worrisome).
8. For example, Randy Hanzlick has argued that "[d]eath investigations may involve
complex medical issues which require physician interpretation and judgment. Therefore, it is
important that these death investigation systems-whether coroner or medical examiner-include
appropriately educated and trained physicians with special expertise in the subject matter."
Hanzlick, supra note 7, at 279. Similarly, in 2015, the National Commission on Forensic Science
requested that "the Attorney General of the United States approve a policy that recommends that
all offices, facilities, or institutions performing medicolegal death investigation activities be
accredited by the year 2020," and stated that "[o]f the estimated 2,366 medicolegal death
investigation offices in the United States, less than 100 are accredited by either the National
Association of Medical Examiners (NAME) or the International Association of Coroners and
Medical Examiners (IAC&ME)." NAT'L COMM'N ON FORENSIC Scl., DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ACCREDITATION OF MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION OFFICES 1 (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/pages/attachments/2015/01/2 1/mdiaccreditationfin
al.pdf [https://perma.cc/EV5E-KDVH].
9. E.g., Lee Epstein, Electoral Benefits: The Assault on the Assaulters of Judicial Elections,
96 JUDICATURE 218, 219-21 (2013); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO
ST. L.J. 43, 51 (2003); cf. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or
Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 290 (2010) (testing the conventional wisdom that appointed judges are more
independent than, and therefore superior to, elected judges).
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that they are going to do that more when elections approach. 10 On the
flip side, the professionals-the ones who have job security and cannot
be removed except for extreme misbehavior-have little incentive to
consider the preferences and needs of those who they are supposed to
be serving. They are going to be more independent, which does not
always result in what is good for society; they may use that
independence to shirk their job obligations. These tensions between
independence and responsiveness are familiar, and much debated, in
the judicial context. Less attention has been paid to whether it is better
to have professionals or politicians populate other key roles in the legal
system, such as prosecutors, defense lawyers, and sheriffs, in addition
to death examiners. We hope to add insight into this question through
an examination of death examiners.
Many of us are familiar with death examiners only through
television, from shows like CSI, Bones, and Body of Proof. There, the
characters tend to be super doctors with unlimited resources to do
whatever tests they want. Reality is different. The systems for death
examination vary considerably across the fifty states. As noted earlier,
in some states, a high school diploma suffices as the qualification to run
for election to be a coroner (the politicians)." In North Carolina, until
1967, all that coroner candidates needed to do to be qualified was "to
declare they had not denied the being of Almighty God or participated
in a duel." 12 In other states, doctors are in charge of the investigations,
but even here there appear to be issues; some doctors are not
pathologists, while others are pathologists who never passed their
board exams.
Death examiners do the first evaluation of a dead body and
determine whether further investigation into the cause of death is
warranted. This decision regarding whether to do additional
investigation (an autopsy) and the quality of the subsequent
investigation that is done if an autopsy is ordered can be important. The
paradigm case is the circumstance where an otherwise healthy person
dies suddenly in a prison lockup. The death examiner will be the one
who typically has to make the decision regarding whether the
10. Epstein, supra note 9, at 220.
11. See, e.g., Randy Hanzlick, Overview of the Medicolegal Death Investigation System in the
United States, in MEDICOLEGAL WORKSHOP SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 7, 9-10. For an example of
the requirements necessary to become a coroner, see Role of the Medical Examiner, FORENSIC SC.,
http://lorpub.gadoe.org/State%20of%/20Georgia/GAVS%20Shared/Science/ForensicScienceAutop
syRoleMedicalExaminerSHARED/ForensicScienceAutopsyRoleMedicalExaminer SHARED5.h
tml (last updated Sept. 1, 2015) [https://perma.cc/7S9R-43MS] (cataloging coroner eligibility
requirements mandated by law in the state of Georgia).
12. BERNARD HIRSCHHORN, DEMOCRACY REFORMED: RICHARD SPENCER CH[LDS AND HIS
FIGHT FOR BETTER GOVERNMENT 156 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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circumstances were suspicious enough to warrant an autopsy and,
further, what level of resources should be expended in doing the autopsy
(additional tests, etc.). If done promptly and properly, an autopsy might,
for example, show that the prisoner was beaten recently, leading to
liability for the state and a political scandal. If not investigated quickly,
the evidence might deteriorate and, indeed, be completely destroyed by
a cremation. The question then is whether having a politician who faces
regular elections, as compared to a professional with job security, in
charge of the death examination process is more or less likely to result
in a proper investigation of what happened. In cases where the death
examination officer is a politician with close ties to the local police, there
might be an incentive to avoid doing too much investigation.1 3 In
contrast, one might also imagine that officials who face regular
elections would be under constant pressure to perform well-
particularly if the local press was monitoring and reporting on
suspicious events-and less susceptible to outside influence such as
bribes or the desire to curry favor with the local police. The point is that,
assuming we think that a process should be put in place such that
suspicious deaths are investigated-and particularly so when they
involve potential abuses by state actors-it is not clear whether elected
politicians or appointed medical professionals would do better.
Autopsies can also yield useful information in other contexts,
especially in terms of revealing undiagnosed illnesses and nonobvious
errors in medical treatments. 1 4 There are significant public health
benefits to knowing why people are dying; autopsies can reveal
spreading diseases that public health officials might not have otherwise
caught. 15 Autopsies, however, require the expenditure of resources.
Even basic autopsies cost over $1,000.16 And that number increases
further if the doctors hired to do the investigations are themselves
13. See, e.g., A.C. Thompson et al., In New Orleans, Uncovering Errors and Oversights, NPR
(Feb. 1, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/01/133301618/in-new-orleans-uncovering-
errors-and-oversights [https://perma.cc/E7TJ-KXQS] (discussing alleged systemic problems in
autopsies in New Orleans); see also Adriane Quinlan, After 40 Years in Office, New Orleans Coroner
Frank Minyard is Moving On, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 2, 2014, 12:47 PM),
http://www.nola.com/health/index.ssfl2014/05/after_40_yearsin office newo.html
[https://perma.cc/8CCP-HTN8] (spotlighting the elected coroner at the center of the controversy in
New Orleans' autopsies).
14. Marshall Allen, Without Autopsies, Hospitals Bury Their Mistakes, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 15,
2011, 12:36 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/without-autopsies-hospitals-bury-their-
mistakes [https://perma.cclYGR8-W2LT] (contending that fewer autopsies in recent years have
allowed medical diagnostic errors to go undiscovered).
15. See Randy Hanzlick, Medical Examiners, Coroners, and Public Health: A Review and
Update, 130 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 1274, 1276-78 (2006) (cataloging the
public health benefits of autopsies).
16. Allen, supra note 14.
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expensive and tend to demand expensive tests. A professional, as
contrasted with a politician, might not be terribly concerned about
spending taxpayer funds on autopsies which, to the extent they unearth
a scandal involving state abuse, might result in taxpayers having to pay
out even more to compensate for the abuse. Will death examiners who
are elected to their positions-and thus are more responsive to taxpayer
concerns-be more sensitive to costs and therefore be in the best
position to make this tradeoff?
Our initial goal with this project was to test the difference in
performance between offices run by appointed medical professionals or
elected coroners (who may not even have a basic medical degree, let
alone be board certified in pathology). As noted, the strong sentiment
in the literature is that medical professionals do a better job than local
politicians.17 This seemed plausible to us, but there is almost no
empirical evidence that supports that claim.18 And there are enough
scandals involving the medical professionals who do death
examinations to at least raise the question that they are not always
doing the best job.19
Our starting hypothesis is that, all else equal, offices run by
professional medical examiners would make fewer errors and be less
likely to be beholden to local political interests than coroners. In the
alternative, the desire for professional qualifications may be overdone
and, worse, driven by some combination of elitism and self-interest of
the medical profession that has a strong influence at institutions, such
as the National Academy of Sciences, that have been pushing for the
17. E.g., JENTZEN, supra note 6; Hanzlick, supra note 7.
18. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text (discussing the NPR and ProPublica
studies).
19. E.g., Radley Balko, The Fifth Circuit Turns Its Back on a Huge Forensics Scandal in
Mississippi, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2014/02/28/the-fifth-circuit-turns-its-back-on-a-huge-forensics-scandal-in-
mississippilutm term=.38ac0167c996 [https://perma.cc/DQU4-CF2E] (discussing controversy in
Mississippi over a medical examiner's practices); Walt Bogdanich, A Mother's Death, a Botched
Inquiry and a Sheriff at War, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/17/us/michelle-oconnell-jeremy-banks.html?_r=1
[https://perma.ccl56CY-Y7FPI (detailing a death investigation scandal in Florida); Conor
Friedersdorf, CSI Is a Lie, ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/csi-is-a-lie/390897/ [https://perma.ccfKW98-
GCA7] (highlighting concerns about forensic and state crime lab systems generally); Jenifer
McKim, Child Deaths Go Unsolved as Autopsies Fall Behind, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 29, 2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/11/28/many-investigations-into-massachusetts-child-
abuse-deaths-remain-limbo-for-years/e4qO9xOmlthllM8PV2rXBN/story.html
[https://perma.ccl6GUL-YWJU] (investigating backlog of autopsies in Massachusetts); This Time,
Fix N.C. Medical Examiner System, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Apr. 7, 2015, 4:40 PM),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/editorials/articlel7747501.html
[https://perma.cc/B54A-6ZE6] (discussing the flaws of the death investigation system in North
Carolina).
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professionalization of the death examiner position.20 Maybe it is not
that difficult to determine whether the circumstances of death are
suspicious and warrant further investigation by a medical professional.
In what follows, we report on our findings. We should state at
the outset though that our findings are limited by the sparseness of the
available data. To the extent that we have persuaded readers that the
underlying question of whether coroners or professional medical
examiners perform better is an important one, our bottom line is that
there is a desperate need for good data.
We focus initially on two measures of performance relevant for
autopsies. First, we look at the number of death examiner offices in a
state that are accredited by the National Association of Medical
Examiners ("NAME").21 We conjecture that accreditation by the NAME
is a proxy for the (high) quality of the death examinations that take
place in the state. The greater the number of accredited death examiner
offices in the state (which can include either a coroner or a professional
medical examiner), the greater is the overall quality of death
examinations in the state. Second, we look at the number of litigation
events related to misconduct in an autopsy under state law. If the death
examiner does a poor job, we expect that the chance of litigation arising
from the low-quality autopsy or decision not to do an autopsy will be
high.
We next look to the question of why any rational state would
have anything but board-certified pathologists doing death
investigations. A century ago, almost all states relied on nonmedical
professionals-coroners-to conduct medical examinations of the
deceased. Historically, coroners often served a nonmedical function,
locating and determining the legal ownership of any found treasure
trove. Commencing about a century ago, states began to shift toward
20. In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences called for a move away from allowing lay
coroners to sign death certificates. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI.
CMTY., NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIs., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD 241-68 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf
[https://perma.cclQWR5-6RFL] (calling for the elimination of the coroner system).
21. The National Association of Medical Examiners
is the national professional organization of physician medical examiners, medicolegal
death investigators and death investigation system administrators who perform the
official duties of the medicolegal investigation of deaths of public interest in the United
States. NAME was founded in 1966 with the dual purposes of fostering the professional
growth of physician death investigators and disseminating the professional and
technical information vital to the continuing improvement of the medical investigation
of violent, suspicious and unusual deaths.
About NAME, NAT'L AsS'N MED. EXAMINERS,
https://netforum.avectra.com/eweblDynamicPage.aspx?Site=NAME&WebCode=AboutNAME
(last visited Sept. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cclSD6N-Q2MY].
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professional medical examiners. While the majority of states today
either exclusively or partially rely on medical examiners, a number of
states continue to rely solely on the coroner system.22 What explains the
persistence of coroners in these states?
There are a number of potential answers. First, it may simply be
local corruption. Politicians may use lower visibility positions to reward
supporters or friends or family of a supporter. The little-followed
coroner position may be an example of the type of position that is given
as a reward. Politicians may either appoint a supporter to the coroner
position or nominate the supporter as the party candidate in an elected
coroner position. We predict that states in which there is greater
corruption and a greater history of political patronage affecting the
staffing of governmental positions will be more likely to have retained
the coroner position and resisted the trend toward professional medical
examiners.
Second, some states have a long tradition of not deferring to
expertise but instead relying on more direct democracy to fill important
governmental positions. Even if some degree of expertise is sacrificed,
such states gain to the extent elected officials are more responsive to
the preferences of citizens and reflect a preference in such states for
direct democracy. We predict that those states that demonstrate a
preference for direct democracy, in particular, those states with an
elected judiciary (whether partisan or nonpartisan elections), will be
more likely to also stay with the coroner system.
In what follows, we briefly describe the scarce literature that
compares coroner and medical examiner systems and then move to
some basic empirical tests using the available data. While the
underlying questions about system design are important and
interesting, the available data is so poor that it is difficult to come to
informed conclusions.
I. BACKGROUND
The legal literature on death examinations is thin. One student
note, from over a decade ago, noted the enormous variation across death
examination systems in the United States, focusing in particular on the
22. Graphics: How Is Death Investigated in Your State?, NPR (Feb. 1, 2011, 12:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/02/03/131242432/graphics-how-is-death-investigated-in-your-state
[https://perma.cc/8AJF-S4SG] (displaying graphically the death investigation systems in each
state).
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differences in required qualifications across the systems.2 3 There are a
handful of other articles discussing the value of resuscitating the
common law procedure of death inquests (grand jury-like procedures to
investigate deaths in certain circumstances), still used in places like
Vermont and Missouri. The legal literature on death examinations ends
there.24
There has been slightly more interest in death investigations in
medical-academic communities and in the popular media. Most
relevant are a series of broadcasts, articles, and reports that NPR
produced between 2011 and 2013, entitled Post-Mortem: Death
Investigation in America.25 In partnership with ProPublica, NPR
conducted a quantitative study of coroner/medical examiner offices
across the United States.26 The study attempted to break down death
investigations by the kind of professional performing each investigation
and also sought to identify how many autopsies were performed versus
how many autopsies might be expected. 27 One can quibble over whether
the number of autopsies performed is a good measure of the quality of
a death examination system-after all, the quality of the autopsies is a
crucial variable here. That said, the gap between expected autopsies
and actual autopsies, if it could be constructed credibly, would give us
a good sense of the variation across systems in terms of whether
investigations were even occurring. Unfortunately, extending NPR's
research effort is not easy-autopsy data is not readily available and
has to be collected by contacting individual death examiner offices. Of
particular relevance to us, NPR's data was collected on very few of the
coroner-only states, which means that the most important comparison
of how coroner-only states were performing against medical examiner
states could not be done in a meaningful fashion. The bottom line of the
23. Andrea R. Tischler, Note, Speaking for the Dead: A Call for Nationwide Coroner Reform,
33 Sw. U. L. REV. 553, 558 (2004) (highlighting the divergence in eligibility requirements between
states).
24. Paul MacMahon, The Inquest and the Virtues of Soft Adjudication, 33 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 275, 281 (2015) (discussing death inquests generally); H. Morley Swingle, Coroner's Inquests
in Missouri: Modern Usage of the Hue and Cry, 63 J. Mo. B. 80, 83 (2007) (discussing death
investigations in Missouri); Paul S. Gillies, When Inquests Were Inquisitions, VT. B.J., Fall 2015,
at 10, 10-15 (discussing death investigations in Vermont).
25. Post Mortem: Death Investigation in America, NPR, http://www.npr.org/series/
133208980/post-mortem-death-investigation-in-america (last updated Jan. 4, 2013)
[https://perma.cc/RVW4-XCMM].
26. Autopsy Data, NPR (Feb. 1, 2011, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/02/
133381758/autopsy-data [https://perma.ccH2Q9-A84Y].
27. Id. The expected autopsy rate was computed based on the CDC mortality data on the
relationship between autopsy rate and the homicide and unintentional-death rate in an area. Id.;
see also Krista Kjellman Schmidt, About Our Autopsy Data, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 1, 2011, 12:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/about-our-autopsy-data [https://perma.cc/42RC-UFNA]
(explaining calculations in greater detail).
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NPR study was that the system as a whole was woeful, with no clear
coroner versus medical examiner result.2 8
ProPublica also published a series of articles illustrating the
problems with death investigations. 29 These articles highlight cases
where the death investigation system has failed and point to the lack of
uniform training and standards, as well as a national shortage of
qualified pathologists to properly investigate each death that merits
such an investigation.3 0 There are also examples in popular news media
of botched autopsies or entire coroner/medical examiner offices run
astray. 31 These articles tend to highlight particularized and especially
egregious examples of poor coroner/medical examiner performance
without examining pervasive, systemic failures of the current death
investigation system.32 There are still other popular news stories
covering more general failures of state crime labs. 33 Overall though,
there is little in the way of systematic data collection or analysis about
the death examination system.
II. DATA
To examine the coroner versus medical examiner question, we
had to first construct measures of quality that could be used to compare
the two systems at the state level. A more fine-tuned analysis would
examine matters at the county level, but for this exploratory
examination, we limited our analysis to the state level. Not being
experts, we spoke to a number of medical examiners and coroners (some
28. See Map: Death in America, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/post-
mortem/map-death-in-americal (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cclC7BJ-G9ZK]
(detailing geographically the varying systems of death investigations in each state).
29. E.g., A.C. Thompson et al., Real CSI: Patchy U.S. Death Investigations Put the Living at
Risk, Scl. AM. (Feb. 1, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/patchy-us-death-
investigations/ [https://perma.cc/3RUT-FCU6] (highlighting shortcomings in the current coroner
system).
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Jessica Pishko, Angela Corey's Forgetful Medical Examiner, NATION (Aug. 30,
2016), https://www.thenation.comarticle/angela-coreys-forgetful-medical-examiner/
[https://perma.cc/PA6Z-GMMW] (documenting allegations that the dementia and problematic
practices of a former medical examiner were intentionally overlooked by a former Florida state
attorney).
32. See, e.g., Jeff Marcu, Chief Medical Examiner Says She Found Malpractice When She
Took over Office, FrRsTCOASTNEWS.COM (Apr. 13, 2012, 8:08 PM),
http://downtownjax.firstcoastnews.com/news/news/77084-chief-medical-examiner-says-she-found-
malpractice-when-she-took-over-office [https://perma.cc/6NYJ-85RK] (recounting systemic issues
within county medical examiner's office).
33. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Crime Lab Scandals Just Keep Getting Worse, SLATE (Oct. 29,
2015, 5:21 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/crime/2015/10/massachusetts
.crime_1ab scandal worsens-dookhan andfarak.html [https://perma.cc/5NXY-JQBNI
(highlighting egregious misconduct by chemist in state drug lab).
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of the latter were also lawyers and judges) about what kinds of
measures they would find to be credible indicators. Considering the
caveat that they all warned us that data would be difficult to obtain, we
posit that the following could act as proxies for death examination
quality.
> Qualifications: Employees with better qualifications
presumably do a better job. In theory, this measure could
look at whether the pathologists doing the autopsies are
board certified. Alternatively, this measure could focus
on the fraction of the pathologists in that state who are
board certified or whether the local offices are accredited
by a credible national or international agency.
> Litigation: Better run offices presumably have fewer
lawsuits brought against them relating to autopsies-
either regarding the quality of a performed autopsy or the
decision whether to perform an autopsy. One indicator of
quality might be the number of lawsuits brought against
death examiners in a state alleging errors in the death
examination process (adjusted for the size of the
population in the state) for a particular time period.
> Scandals: Even good offices make errors. But large and
systemic problems-the kinds of events that make for
news stories-are likely a sign of dysfunction. A possible
indicator of office quality, therefore, is the number of
major news stories in a particular time period regarding
systemic problems in a local death examiner office. 34
> Scope: Some offices investigate deaths more extensively
than others-that is, their threshold for what deaths are
deemed suspicious is lower. Possible measures of this are
the yearly expenditures of the office and the fraction of
possibly suspicious deaths for which autopsies are
actually conducted.
One could imagine even more intricate measures that would
address specific concerns about having political actors running death
34. An alternate source of information here, which we are considering for future research, is
ethics complaints against public officials. Most states have procedures that allow for complaints
to be made against public officials, and there is often information about the substance of the
complaints. See, e.g., Forrest Berkshire, Deputy Coroner Resigns After Ethics Complaint Filed, KY.
STANDARD (May 1, 2014, 8:32 AM), http://www.kystandard.com/content/deputy-coroner-resigns-
after-ethics-complaint-filed [https://perma.cc/556H-K7RU] (detailing basis for ethics complaint
against coroner).
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examinations, such as the fraction of suspicious prison deaths that do
not get investigated. One might also look at the fraction of initial
autopsies where a second one-requested by family members or
performed by an outside agency-concludes with a different result. We
decided for the purpose of this Article to focus on the basic measures.
Of the four measures, we made progress in obtaining
information related to the first two proxies for death examination
quality listed above: measures of whether the offices in the state had
been certified by a credible national agency and numbers of litigation
events. We were unable to generate measures related to the latter two
proxies. Systematic measures of autopsy-related scandals, based on a
search from a subset of national news outlets, turned out to be difficult.
Many stories relating to autopsy scandals do not make it to the national
news, and comparing news stories from local outlets that vary
enormously in quality and coverage is difficult. Finally, the scope
measure was one that we were initially hoping to use based on the
methodology used in the NPR and ProPublica study (including in
particular the difference between actual numbers of autopsies and
expected numbers of autopsies). However, it turned out to be difficult to
obtain data on either the numbers of autopsies or the budgets of
individual offices. There are no reliable published sources, and our
attempts at contacting individual offices for information were
unsuccessful. For future research, we hope to set up a more extensive
research team to start collecting the kind of ground level data that we
were unable to obtain in our initial attempts.
We obtained data on whether a state only has coroners (Coroner
Only) or has either a mix of medical examiners and coroners or only
medical examiners (Partial or Medical Examiner Only) from the work
of Randy Hanzlick, the chief medical examiner of Fulton County
(Georgia). 35 We also obtained data on the number of medical examiner
offices in a state that are accredited by the NAME, as measured in 2016.
We compared states directly based on NAME. Because the population
of a state may affect the NAME number, we also compared states based
on the NAME per million people in the population in 2010.
We obtained data on the number of autopsy-related litigation
cases involving allegations of misconduct from January 1, 1950, to
February 1, 2017, through searches on Westlaw and Lexis. Our search
uncovered only those cases with opinions that appear in Westlaw or
Lexis, so the search is likely underinclusive of all autopsy-related
litigation. In addition, given that most of the public officials being sued
35. Hanzlick & Combs, supra note 7, at 871.
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will have some kind of qualified immunity from suit,36 some of the
claims may be getting dismissed early in the litigation process on
immunity grounds and, as a result, may not appear in Westlaw or Lexis.
Nonetheless, to the extent that the number of cases without
opinions is not correlated with Coroner Only compared with Partial or
Medical Examiner Only states, our comparison provides an accurate
depiction of the relative performance of Coroner Only and Partial or
Medical Examiner Only states. Because the amount of autopsy
litigation is correlated with the number of deaths in a state (which in
turn is correlated with state population), we scale the number of
autopsy litigation cases by the population of each state measured in
1950 (Autopsy litigation per million population in 1950).
III. ANALYSIS
As noted above, the ProPublica/NPR study collected data on a
variable-the abnormal autopsy rate-that we thought would be a good
preliminary indicator on the question we were interested in
investigating. However, as mentioned above, the study did not collect
data on enough of the Coroner Only states to provide meaningful
evidence of the difference. Still, we report our analysis of their data to
provide a sense of the direction in which their results point.
Figure 1 reports a comparison of abnormal autopsy rates,
defined as the difference between, actual autopsy rates and expected
rates, for Coroner Only states, states using a mix of the Coroner and
Medical Examiner systems, and states using the Medical Examiner
system only. The NPR website explains:
The autopsy rate is calculated based on autopsies per 100,000 deaths. Then, using the
CDC mortality data, ProPublica looked at the relationship between the autopsy rate and
the rates of unintentional deaths and homicides. They found that the higher the homicide
and unintentional-death rate in an area, the higher the autopsy rate tends to be. They
used this relationship to compute an expected autopsy rate and then compared the
expected autopsy rate and the actual autopsy rate to see whether counties and states
performed fewer, more than or the expected number of autopsies, given their rates of
unintentional deaths and homicides. 37
The bar graphs in Figure 1 show that the gap between autopsy
and expected autopsy rates for Medical Examiner Only states is
different from states with Partial systems (termed "Mix" in the Figure)
and from states with Coroner Only systems. And, while the differences
36. See, e.g., Waeschle v. Dragovic, 576 F.3d 539, 543-44 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing a
government official's qualified immunity defense); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.015 (2017)
(codifying qualified immunity defense for coroners and medical examiners).
37. Autopsy Data, supra note 26.
2017] 1721
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:6:1709
are not statistically significant, Figure 1 paints a distinct picture: other
things equal, medical examiners perform more autopsies than coroners
compared with the number of expected autopsies.
FIGURE 1: ABNORMAL AUTOPSY RATE (NPR/PROPUBLICA 2007 DATA)
3.1%
20%
0% -
-2.0%
Medical Examiner Only Cor0ner Onlyj
-4,0% +
-6-0% +
-8,0%
-10.0%
-12-0%
-5.5%
-10.5%
SOURCE: Autopsy Data, NPR (Feb.
http://www.npr.org/2011/02/02/133381758/autopsy-data
A84Y].
1, 2011, 4:02 PM)
[https://perma.cc/H2Q9-
Next, we move to the data we collected on accreditation and
litigation. Table 1 reports on the comparison between Partial or Medical
Examiner Only states and Coroner Only states. For purposes of our
binary comparisons, we group Partial and Medical Examiner Only
states to test whether states that have at least some use of medical
examiners (and thus at some point experienced a decision to implement
medical examiners) differ from states that continue to use only
coroners.
1722
ADJUDICATING DEATH
TABLE 1: STATE COMPARISON FOR AUTOPSY QUALITY
Partial or Coroner p-value of
Medical Only Test of
Examiner Only State Difference
State
Number of NAME Accredited 3.051 1.273 0.077
Offices in 2016
Number of NAME Accredited 0.543 0.305 0.111
Offices in 2016 per Million
Population*
Autopsy Litigation from 1950 4.285 10.010 0.060
to 2017 per Million
Population**
*For the Number of NAME Accredited Offices in 2016 per Million Population
measure, we used state population data from 2010.
**For the Autopsy Litigation from 1950 to 2017 per Million Population measure, we
used state population data from 1950.
As we observed with the ProPublica autopsy data, under each of
our measures for the quality of medical examinations, we find evidence
that coroners perform poorly compared with professional medical
examiners. Coroners are correlated with both fewer absolute numbers
of accredited medical examiner offices as well as fewer accredited offices
per million in population. The difference between Coroner Only and
Partial or Medical Examiner Only states is significant at the 10% level
for the absolute NAME measure. The difference for the NAME per
million population measure is significant at the 11.1% level, just beyond
conventional levels of statistical significance. Likewise, we find that
Coroner Only states experience higher litigation rates involving
autopsies compared with Partial or Medical Examiner Only states. This
difference is significant at the 10% level.
We next look to gain traction on the question of why a state
might choose to stay with a coroner system. Specifically, we look to
examine whether states that remain exclusively with the coroner
system do so because of corruption or out of a preference for direct
democracy, even at the expense of medical examination quality. As a
measure of corruption, we utilize the ranking of states from the Center
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for Public Integrity in 2015.38 The Center for Public Integrity gives each
state a corruption grade based on its assessment of the state along a
number of categories including political financing, electoral oversight,
lobbying disclosure, executive accountability, legislative accountability,
and judicial accountability, among other categories. We focus in
particular on those states that earned an "F' grade in 2015, accounting
for eleven of the fifty states. Table 2 reports on the comparison of
Coroner Only and Partial or Medical Examiner Only states based on
the incidence of "F' corruption grades.
TABLE 2: STATE COMPARISON OF CORRUPTION SCORE
Partial or Medical Coroner p-value of Test of
Examiner Only State Only State Difference
State 0.150 0.500 0.016
Corruption
"F" Score in
2015*
*State corruption score from the Center for Public Integrity 2015 state rankings.
Note from Table 2 that half of the Coroner Only states received
an "F' grade in 2015 while only 15% of the Partial or Medical Examiner
Only states received an "F' grade. This difference is significant at the
1.6% confidence level. Put differently, the states using the coroner
system are among the most corrupt in terms of government officials.
An alternative story for the use of coroner systems is that the
populations for some states might have a strong preference for direct
democracy. As a multivariate test of when a state shifted to either a
partial or medical examiner only system, we estimated a series of Cox
proportional hazard models for the first adoption of a professional
medical examiner in a state, looking at state-year level data. The Cox
proportional hazard model is a type of statistical survival model that
relates the time until a specified event to various independent variables
that may affect the amount of time until the event (such as the state
population over time). For the independent variables in the Cox
proportional hazards model, we include the log of the state population
determined by the most recent census (so for 1964 we used the 1960
state population), as well as indicator variables for the judicial selection
regime for state supreme court judges as a proxy for the state's
38. Yue Qiu et al., How Does Your State Rank for Integrity?, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov.
9, 2015, 12:04 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/11/09/18822/how-does-your-state-rank-
integrity [https://perma.ccIV2NZ-L2SZ].
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preference for direct democracy. We code the judicial selection systems
in terms of four broad categories of systems that are frequently used in
the literature comparing the different systems: Appointment, Merit
Selection, Partisan Election, and Nonpartisan Election. 39 We use
Nonpartisan Election for state supreme court judges as the base
category. Model 1 of Table 3 reports the results. 40
TABLE 3: HAZARD MODEL OF ADOPTION OF MEDICAL EXAMINER
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ln (state 1.205 1.235 1.305
population) (1.07) (1.11) (1.21)
Partisan Election 2.079 - 2.064
(1.28) - (1.24)
Merit Selection 3.354* - 3.375*
(2.24) - (2.01)
Appointment 3.483* - 3.517+
(2.25) - (1.82)
Northeast - 1.758 1.277
- (1.07) (0.35)
South - 2.087 1.350
- (1.57) (0.59)
West - 1.284 1.657
(0.44) (0.81)
N 2760 2760 2760
pseudo 12 0.040 0.023 0.043
Log likelihood -121.4 -123.7 -121.0
Exponentiated coefficients; z-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, p < 0.05.
In Model 1 of Table 3, note that the coefficients on Merit
Selection and Appointment are both greater than one, indicating an
increased probability of shifting to a professional medical examiner
39. These are explained in Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 9, at 297.
40. As a historical matter, the choices of state judicial election systems have been far more
stable than the choices about whether to use a coroner system. See id. at 303-04 (discussing the
stability of the judicial selection systems). As a practical matter, the judicial regimes were almost
all put in place prior to the shift toward a professional medical examiner system (and therefore
may be treated as roughly exogenous for our purposes). According to Hanzlick and Combs, the
shift toward the medical examiner system was occurring on a fairly steady basis from the 1880s
until roughly the 1980s, when it slowed down considerably. See Hanzlick & Combs, supra note 7,
at 872-73.
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compared with the base category of Nonpartisan Election states
(significant at the 5% confidence level). This is consistent with a
preference (as measured by the type of judicial selection system used)
for direct democracy impacting how a state selects its coroners.
Nonetheless, the differences between the coefficients for Partisan
Election and Merit Selection and the coefficients for Partisan Election
and Appointment are not significantly different from zero.
To test whether there is a geographic region effect, we remove
the judge selection indicator variables and replace them with regional
indicators for whether a state is a member of U.S. Census Region
Northeast, South, or West, with the Midwest as the base category.
Model 2 of Table 3 reports the results. None of the coefficients on the
regional indicators are significantly different from zero. Thus, region
itself does not explain the shift to a professional medical examiner
system.
Lastly, Model 3 of Table 3 combines the indicator variables for
the judge selection regime with the region indicator variables. As
reported in Model 3, the indicator variables for the Merit Selection and
Appointment regimes continue to be greater than one and significant,
consistent with citizens from more election-focused states preferring to
remain with the coroner system. However, as with Model 1, the
differences between the coefficients for Partisan Election and Merit
Selection and the coefficients for Partisan Election and Appointment
are not significantly different from zero.
CONCLUSION
Despite the limited availability of data, we can make a few
observations about coroner systems versus medical examiner ones.
Generally speaking, the death examiner offices in coroner states
perform fewer autopsies than they should, are less likely to be
accredited by the major national organization, and generate greater
amounts of litigation. Of these three measures that we report on, the
accreditation number is perhaps the most meaningful. In theory, death
examination offices run by politicians could do well on these scores, but
our findings suggest that they do not. An alternative possibility,
though, is that the accreditation system is run by the professional
medical examiners and biased against the offices in coroner states.
The next question to ask is why states choose to remain with the
coroner systems, despite the wide condemnation they have received.
Two possibilities that we cannot dismiss are (a) that states with greater
amounts of official corruption prefer elected officials doing death
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examinations, and (b) that these are states that, as a general matter,
prefer direct democracy.
Our results do no more than begin to identify the differences
between coroner and medical examiner systems in terms of quality. We
hope to have shown, however, that it is worth investing in better data,
so that scholars can begin to get some traction on answering these
questions more thoroughly.
There are two lines of attack that could be usefully pursued.
First, there is the cross-sectional data comparing states (and better,
counties) in terms of the relative performances of their departments,
controlling for variables that might capture local differences. Second,
given that a number of states (and counties) have changed their
systems in recent years-North Carolina, for example 41-scholars can
now do case studies of the individual county systems and compare the
before and after results of the change.
41. See Jon Evans, Senate Votes to Abolish Columbus County Coroner's Office, WECT (Apr.
19, 2017, 7:24 PM), http://www.wect.com/story/35193713/senate-votes-to-abolish-columbus-
county-coroners-office [https://perma.cc/9C8D-9SPF] (recording vote to abolish coroners' offices in
multiple counties).
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